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INTRODUCTION
Across America, prosecutors and legislators are pushing to try
more juveniles as adults. Yet simultaneously, law-abiding
adolescents are subject to ever-widening restrictions that treat
them explicitly as non-adults--curfews, parental-consent
requirements, an array of zero-tolerance policies at schools.'
Between 1992 and 1997, forty-seven states altered their
treatment ofjuvenile offenders.2 Forty-five states made it easier to
transfer juveniles to criminal court and to try a juvenile as an
adult.3 Thirty-one states enhanced the sentencing authority of their
juvenile courts.4 All forty-seven states making changes modified or
removed the traditional confidentiality associated with the juvenile
justice system.5 Such changes indicate, at least where criminal
responsibility is implicated, that the distinction between adoles-
cence and adulthood is being conflated.6
In 1991, studies of juvenile abortion statutes indicated that
fourteen states required a juvenile seeking an abortion to notify or
acquire consent from at least one parent.7 In 1998, the number of
states with mandatory parental involvement laws had risen to
1. David Cray, U.S. Wrestles with Juveniles'Age of Responsibility; They can be Sent to
Death Row Yet Not Buy Alcohol, SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE, Dec. 10, 2000, at A8.
2. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS & VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 89 (1999).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547,
547-48 (2000).
7. Allison Beth Hubbard, Recent Development, The Erosion of Minors'Abortion Rights:
An Analysis of Hodson v. Minnesota and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 1
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 227, 227 (1991). These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at 227n3.
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thirty-seven.' Currently the number of states with a parental
involvement law is forty-two.9 Although not all states with parental
involvement laws actively enforce their provisions,1" it is neverthe-
less clear that regulation of abortion on the basis of age has
increased. Insofar as the predicate of the diminishment of a
juvenile's right to abortion is maturity, recent legislation in this
area indicates an equivocation of adolescence and childhood.1"
The contrary equivocations of adolescence as adulthood in
criminal law and adolescence as childhood in abortion legislation
indicates a less than consistent view of the relationship of responsi-
bility and age in the law. 2 Although there are legitimate reasons
to differentiate responsibility as it relates to different rights and
responsibilities, 3 the debate surrounding the issues of juvenile
crime and abortion does not lend itself to such policy distinctions.
In this note, I will lay out the history and law surrounding the
treatment of responsibility as it relates to juvenile crime and
abortion. Recent legislation in Virginia and 4th circuit decisions
will be used as an illustration of the current disparity in thought
relating to responsibility. The simultaneous ebb of a juvenile's
presumed responsibility to make reproductive decisions and flow of
a juvenile's presumed responsibility for criminal act will be
compared and criticized. Ultimately, although the law tells an
inconsistent story where it relates to juvenile responsibility, it is
doubtful that legislators intend such a mixed message. Rather,
they likely intend no message at all. It is likely supervening
8. Rachel Weissmann, Constitutional Law What "Choice" do They Have?: Protecting
Pregnant Minors' Reproductive Rights Using State Constitutions, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
129, 130 (1999).
9. NARAL Pro-Choice America, Restriction on Minor's Access to Abortion, available at
http://www.naral.org/mediaresources/fact/pdfs/restrictions.pdf. These states
include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
10. Id. The states that do not enforce their parental involvement laws are: Alaska,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, and New
Mexico. Id. Generally, the statutes are not enforced due to an order of the court or judgment
of the Attorney General that the law is unenforceable. Id. New Jersey's statute is currently
on appeal. NARAL, Pro-choice America, New Jersey, available at
http://mail.naral.org/longdoc.nsf.
11. Scott, supra note 6 at 548-49.
12. Id. at 597-98.
13. Id. at 570.
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political considerations lead the law to contradictory presumptions
regarding juveniles.
II. HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA
A. Common Law Origins
Originally, at common law, there was no separate system for
juveniles. 4 Adults and juveniles were tried in the same courts, and
if convicted, were punished similarly. 5 There developed, however,
a defense for juveniles based on their youth. 6 "Common law
criminal culpability was based on both an assumption of capacity
to know wrongfulness and proof of specific mens rea required to
commit a crime." 7 Juveniles, as less capable of distinguishing good
and evil and less able to form the required intent, were presumed
to lack the culpability to be punished.'" This presumption formed
the basis of the infancy defense.' 9 The infancy defense is a sliding
scale series of presumptions setting forth rebuttable and non-
rebuttable levels of culpability based on the juvenile's age.2°
Children under the age of seven were conclusively presumed to
be incapable of taking responsibility for their acts and thus were
precluded from criminal adjudication. Children over the age of
fourteen were regarded as adults and thus were presumed
capable of committing crimes. Between these two ages the
common law created a rebuttable presumption of incapacity.
For a child between the ages of seven and fourteen to be subject
to the criminal jurisdiction of the court, the state had to over-
come a presumed incapacity on the part of the child by showing
that the child knew the wrongfulness of his act.2'
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries social
attitudes regarding children began to change.22 Reformers of the
era believed that since all juveniles lacked capacity, and this
incapacity is based on immaturity, a separate judicial system
14. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLAL. REV.
503, 509 (1984).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 509-10.
17. Id. at 509.
18. Id. at 509-10.
19. Id. at 510.
20. Id at 510-11.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 512.
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should be established to administer to the immature rather than
punish the criminal.23 The assumption was that the delinquent
behavior of the juveniles was the result of immaturity rather than
a criminal mind.2 4 The proper response to this, it was supposed,
was the edification and rehabilitation of the child in a justice
system removed from adult (criminal) influence.2"
The focus of the juvenile justice system was rehabilitation of
the immature and misguided rather than punishment of the
criminal.26 As a non-criminal court that did not mete out punish-
ment but acted to help the child and further the development of the
child towards citizenship, the juvenile courts were designed without
the procedural safeguards found in criminal courts.27 Without a
threat of punishment there was nothing for procedure to safeguard.
Juveniles were nevertheless exposed to dispositions that, while
benefiting and rehabilitating the juvenile, would act to limit their
freedom and rights. Eventually, these well meaning impositions on
juvenile rights lead to the imposition of some procedural safeguards
by the Supreme Court.2" Ironically, it was this attempt to protect
the juvenile that ultimately lead to a more punitive understanding
ofjuvenilejustice. 29 Beginning in 1967, the Supreme Court decided
a series of cases that shifted the focus of the juvenile court from
determinations of delinquency to determinations more closely
resembling criminal responsibility.3"
B. Supreme Court Criminalizes Childhood
In 1966 the Supreme Court decided Kent v. United States.31 In
Kent, the District of Columbia Juvenile Court waived jurisdiction
over Morris Kent and transferred the youth to district court to be
tried on charges of robbery and rape.32 To make such a transfer,
the juvenile court was required to hold a hearing after a full
23. Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy is the
Preadolescent's Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 171 (2000).
24. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Response to Youth Violence,
24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 192-93 (1998).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28-31 (1967).
29. See Bazelon, supra note 23, at 173-179; Feld, supra note 24, at 193-205; Walkover,
supra note 14, at 517-528.
30. Feld, supra note 24, at 193.
31. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
32. Id. at 547-48.
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investigation. 3 The investigation into Morris Kent's case was less
than complete.34 "Dismissing the procedure afforded Morris Kent
as inadequate, the Supreme Court held that juvenile waiver orders
must be grounded in a hearing, that counsel must have access to
records and reports considered by the court, and that a statement
of reasons must accompany the waiver order. 3' Despite the fact
that the Kent decision only imposed procedural safeguards in
juvenile court where criminal sanctions and transfer to criminal
court were threatened, the effect of Kent was to initiate enforcement
of procedural safeguards in juvenile court.36
One year after Kent, the Supreme Court decided In re Gault.3v
Gault expanded the procedural safeguards of Kent. In Gault, the
Court held that the essentials of due process were required in the
adjudicatory stage of juvenile justice proceedings. 3' Gerald Gault,
charged with making lewd phone calls, argued that the procedures
of his delinquency hearing denied his constitutional rights to notice,
counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and appellate review.39 The Court concluded that all
of the rights asserted in Gault - save appellate review - are
guaranteed by the due process clause and are thus binding in
juvenile court adjudication.4"
Gault represents the expansion of the Kent procedural safe-
guards requirement when a juvenile is threatened with criminal
adjudication to non-criminal juvenile adjudication. To the extent
that these procedural safeguards find their ultimate foundation in
the deprivation of rights threatened by criminal-type hearings,
Gault identifies structural elements of criminal-type hearings
within juvenile hearings and then begins the equivocation of
criminal and juvenile justice. For example, the Gault court
describes reform schools and related facilities associated with
juvenile justice as similar to the penitentiaries associated with
criminal justice.41 They further identify the culpability associated
with juvenile dispositions with criminal responsibility.42
33. Id.
34. Id. at 546.
35. Walkover, supra note 14, at 519.
36. Id. at 519-20.
37. Gault, 387 U.S. at 1.
38. Id. at 30-31.
39. Id. at 9-10.
40. Id. at 10, 33-34, 41-42, 57-59.
41. Id. at 27.
42. Id. at 26-27.
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The Supreme Court continued the association of youthful
misdeeds and hardened criminal behavior in In re Winship, decided
three years after Gault." In Winship, the Supreme Court required
that the burden of proof used in juvenile court cases be identical to
that involved in criminal cases, namely, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt." In so ruling, the Supreme Court removed most of the civil
aspects of the juvenile justice system that was remaining after Kent
and Gault.45
The shift undertaken by Kent, Gault, and Winship represents
the transformation of the legal conception of juvenile justice from
a rehabilitative system to a junior criminal system where criminal
responsibility is the focus of the inquiry.4 The Supreme Court
successfully redefined the proper scope of juvenile justice froman
inquiry into maturity, development, and rehabilitation to one of
criminal responsibility and punishment with attendant threats to
liberty. Given these Supreme Court decisions, whose effect is to
criminalize the juvenile courts, the recent actions of state and
federal law makers to lower ages at which juveniles can be tried as
adults, increase punishments in juvenile court settings, and
decrease the confidentiality associated with the juvenile court
process should come as no surprise. The decisions of the Supreme
Court removed much of the differentiation between immaturity and
criminal responsibility upon which the juvenile court system was
traditionally predicated.
C. Lawmakers Criminalize Increasingly Younger Groups of
Children
Since 1990, the US has executed more people for crimes
committed when they were children than any other country in
the world .... Now Jim Pitts, a Republican representative in
the Texas legislature, wants to make it legal to execute children
as young as 11. He is to introduce legislation recommending the
death sentence for 11-year-old killers and adult sentences for
offenders aged 10 and above....
Some blame television violence or parental neglect, others
point to the availability of weapons in a country where one in 12
students carries a gun....
43. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
44. Id. at 361-68.
45. Walkover, supra note 14, at 520-21.
46. Id. at 522.
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Jim Pitts' proposed law has been dismissed by death
penalty opponents and George Bush Jr, the Texas governor, has
distanced himself from the idea.
But Pitts has the backing of voters and politicians of both
parties."
The proposal of Representative Pitts in Texas is undoubtedly
one of the most extreme examples of the movement to apply
criminal responsibility to ever younger groups of juveniles. It is
nevertheless indicative of the general trend.4" The attempt to apply
the death penalty to an eleven-year-old is particularly disturbing as
it displays a blatant indifference to clearly established notions of
criminal responsibility in the Supreme Court's death penalty
jurisprudence."
The Supreme Court's juvenile death penalty jurisprudence is
important to the issue of juvenile justice generally, because it
establishes that maturity and criminal responsibility is a necessary
factor in criminal adjudication and sentencing. It is of limited use,
however, because the preclusion effected on criminal law by
immaturity is due in no small part to the severity of the criminal
punishment in question. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the court held
that a fifteen-year-old juvenile, as a general rule, lacks the culpabil-
ity proportional to a criminal sanction of death.0 Despite initial
recourse in Thompson to precedent based on "evolving standards of
decency,"51 standards based in state practice that appear to be
evolving chronologically downwards,52 the Court grounded it's
Eighth Amendment decision in psychological studies indicating that
juveniles tend to lack some degree of criminal capacity.53 For the
47. Emma Nugent & Allan Hall, Too Young to Drink but Old Enough to Execute; The
Teenagers on Death Row USA, SCOTTISH DAILY RECORD & SUNDAY MAIL, Oct. 12, 1999, at
26-27.
48. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (arguing that punishment must
be proportional to culpability); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (showing that the
plurality of Court supported proportionality jurisprudence).
50. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821-25. Justice O'Connor declines to concur with the majority
position that a sixteen-year-old is not sufficiently culpable to be put to death as a per se rule,
but Justice O'Connor grants that absent a showing of maturity the sixteen-year-old may be
presumed immature for death penalty purposes. Id. at 850-56.
51. Id. at 821-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). "Evolving standards
of decency" essentially ground Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the practices of the
states. Id. at 822n4. If the states decided to execute eleven-year-olds, this interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment would not appear to be a hindrance to such practices, as those
practices define the acceptable limit of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
52. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 2 at 5.
53. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833-35.
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Supreme Court, this justifies the presumption that certainjuveniles
are unlikely to possess the sort of bad intent required for a punish-
ment of death. 4 Thompson is ultimately reliant on both evolving
state practices and the developmental psychology underlying
proportionality analysis. The split reasoning of the plurality
opinion, fails to make clear a minimum age, or even if there is a
minimum age, at which criminal responsibility may be found.
The proposal of Representative Pitts was neither accepted nor
passed by the Texas legislature. It nevertheless portends an ever
growing understanding of children as little adults subject to
criminal sanctions. This understanding is especially dangerous as
portions of the Court do not accept proportionality analysis, 55 and
rely exclusively on state centered evolving standards of decency
analysis. Such evolving standards of decency ultimately rely on
state actors like Representative Pitts.
1. Transfer Provisions
Although the ages at which a juvenile can be transferred to
criminal court are trending downwards, transfer is not a new
phenomenon. As early as the 1920's, states had provisions to
transfer juveniles to adult court under appropriate circumstances. 6
Currently all states have a transfer provision of some sort. 7 The
purpose of the transfer provision is to move a defendant, who by age
is within the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court, to a criminal
court. 58
A majority of the states set the maximum age of original
jurisdiction in juvenile court at seventeen. 59 Three states have set
the age of original jurisdiction at fifteen;6" the remaining states
place the age at sixteen.61 Unlike the recent changes in transfer
54. Id.
55. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361. Justices Scalia, White, Kennedy, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected the notion that punishment should not be disproportionate to culpability.
Id. See generally infra notes 221-41 and accompanying text (discussing Stanford and
Thompson).
56. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 1, at 13.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 9.
60. These States are Connecticut, New York, and North Carolina. Id.
61. Id. Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire,
South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin are the ten States allowing for a jurisdictional cut off
at the age of sixteen.
AN UNJUST ACT
provisions, there has been little change in the age at which the
juvenile court loses original jurisdiction.62
Transfer provisions are generally of three major types: the
judicial waiver, concurrent jurisdiction, and statutory exclusion. 3
The predominant method is judicial waiver.64 Judicial waiver
allows the juvenile court judge to waive the original jurisdiction of
the juvenile court and transfer the juvenile to criminal court.65
Judicial waiver itself comes in three forms: discretionary, manda-
tory, and presumptive waiver.66 Discretionary waiver allows the
court, generally once petitioned by the prosecutor, to transfer the
case provided that such transfer is appropriate in light of statuto-
rily proscribed factors for transfer.67 Most important among such
factors are age of the defendant and nature of the crime.6" Addi-
tional factors include: use of firearms in the crime, amenability to
treatment in the juvenile justice system, availability of appropriate
disposition in the juvenile court, time available for sanctions, public
safety, and best interest of the child.69 Mandatory waiver statutes
compel the juvenile court judge to transfer the case, provided the
case meets certain absolute criterion similar to the discretionary
waiver factors.7" A presumptive waiver statute creates a rebuttable
presumption that the juvenile should be transferred.7'
A statutory exclusion statute functions similarly to mandatory
waiver except the juvenile is never in the original jurisdiction of the
juvenile court due to her age and the nature of her crime.72
Concurrent jurisdiction, on the other hand, effectively allows the
prosecutor to determine the jurisdiction wherein he wishes to try
the case.73 A concurrent jurisdiction statute provides that the
juvenile court and the district court both have jurisdiction over the
62. Id. at 9:
Since 1975, four States have changed their age criteria: Alabama increased its
upper age from 15 to 16 in 1976 and to 17 in 1977; Wyoming reduced its upper
age from 18 to 17 in 1993; and New Hampshire and Wisconsin lowered their
upper age from 17 to 16 in 1996.
Id.
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id. at 14.
65. Id. at 13.
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id. at 14.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 13.
73. Id.
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juvenile; thus the prosecutor may bring the case wherever he
chooses. 4
Depending on the crime and the age of the juvenile, more than
one of the above transfer provisions may be applicable.75 For lesser
offenses, discretionary judicial waiver is most likely to be applica-
ble.7" The older the juvenile and the more serious the crime, the
more likely a lawmaking body has required the transfer of a
juvenile by mandatory judicial waiver or statutory exclusion.77
The advantage of the discretionary judicial waiver is that the
court may inquire into issues of capacity and criminal responsibil-
ity, along with the more popular factor of the severity of the crime.7"
The mandatory waiver and statutory exclusion creates a legislative
presumption of capacity and criminal responsibility, at least if one
goes so far as to assume that exposure to criminal liability ought to
imply criminal responsibility. The same would be true to a lesser
extent in the case of presumptive waivers.
During the 1990's an increasing number of states passed laws
adding or expanding mandatory waiver and statutory exclusion
provisions. 9 Currently fifteen states have presumptive waiver
statutes, fourteen states have mandatory waiver statutes, and
twenty-eight states have statutory exclusion provisions.8 0
Enhancing this movement to assign criminal responsibility to
younger individuals for more crimes in more states are once an
adult / always an adult statutes.81 These statutes require that once
a juvenile is convicted of a crime in criminal court, all subsequent
offenses must be tried in criminal court.8 2
The general drift of the transfer provisions is a growing
assumption that juveniles who commit certain crimes ought to be
subject to criminal liability in a criminal court. The trend is away
from allowing considerations of capacity to determine a juvenile's
placement in criminal court. Even when considerations of capacity
may be made, as in discretionary waiver, maturity is only one of
many factors that may be considered and weighed. Thus, even in
the best cases, a lack of capacity may not be determinative.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 14.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (2001).
79. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 14.
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 14.
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2. Criminalization of the Juvenile Court System
The most profound increase in the criminalization of juvenile
justice has been in the increasing use of waiver and transfer
provisions. Nevertheless, the dispositions used in the juvenile
courts themselves also implicate the criminalization of juvenile
justice. The most explicit example of this is the movement from
traditional indeterminate sentences focused on rehabilitation to
determinate sentences focused on restraint.
"Historically, the premise of sentencing in the juvenile court
system was the 'best interests' of the child-offender implemented
through indeterminate and non-proportional dispositions." 3
Dispositions in the juvenile justice system were not intended to
punish, but were intended to save the delinquent from his delin-
quency through rehabilitation. 4 They acted to rehabilitate by
'sentencing' the juvenile to an indeterminate term of treatment
focused on curing the juvenile of delinquency. Today, however,
states are restraining the discretion of the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the juvenile through the statutory imposition of
determinate and proportional sentencing guidelines.5
Sentencing guidelines in the juvenile court context, remove the
focus of the proceeding from the offender to the offense. 6 No longer
is the juvenile court concerned with open-ended treatment of the
actor; rather, a determinate punishment is proscribed in proportion
to the act. As in criminal court, where certain acts carry proscribed
punishments, juveniles are being incarcerated according to their
acts. Recidivism is discouraged through threat of future punish-
ment rather than through correcting the failings of the juvenile's
character caused, in part, by immaturity. 7
In light of In re Gault,"8 a movement from indeterminate to
determinate sentencing procedures was inevitable. The Supreme
Court, by equivocating criminal and juvenile court, required that
the constitutional rights of the juvenile be protected as though he
were in criminal court.8 9 The imposition of determinate sentencing
protects the juvenile from disparate treatment by enhancing
83. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821,848 (1988) [Hereinafter Juvenile
Court Meets the Principle of Offense].
84. Id.
85. Id. at 849-50.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1.
89. Id.
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guarantees of uniformity, certainty, and proportionality in the
sentencing.90 Insofar as uniformity, certainty, and proportionality
are values that implicate Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection issues, the movement in juvenile justice is towards a
greater level of constitutionality.9' This movement, however, is only
necessary if juvenile justice is understood as punitive, as In re
Gault insists it is.92 The rehabilitative treatment of previous
juvenile justice, while not without a constitutional dimension, does
not implicate the alienation of rights in the same way that criminal
incarceration does.
In re Gault supposes that juvenile justice is partly punitive.
Constitutional principles of criminal justice require the imposition
of determinate punishments to avoid Eighth Amendment disparate
treatment concerns. Any determinate punishment must be
proportional to the wrongful act under the Eighth Amendment. The
imposition of determinate punishments thus makes juvenile justice
more punitive by forcing a focus on the act rather than the actor.
This in turn leads to an increase in punishment, a decrease in
rehabilitation, and the criminalization of youth. In re Gault
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy by assuming minimal criminality,
which implicates determinate sentencing, thereby leading to a focus
on the criminality of the act, and therefrom the criminality of the
actor. The irony of this prophecy is that the right to a jury trial is
not granted under In re Gault or it's successors despite the
introduction of criminal-type proceedings in juvenile court caused
by In re Gault.93
III. ABORTION, JUVENILES, AND
PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT STATUTES
In 1973, the Supreme Court upheld a woman's right of choice
in reproductive matters by extending a woman's right of privacy
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the right to choose an
abortion.94 In Roe, the court made clear, however, that this right is
not absolute, and the right must be balanced with a state's interest
in the health of the mother and the fetus. 95 After Roe, many states
90. Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense, supra note 83, at 853-57.
91. Id.
92. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 28-31.
93. See Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense, supra note 83, at 858-59 (discussing
constitutional challenges to Washington's juvenile law based on the absence of jury trials).
94. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
95. Id. at 162-64.
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enacted mandatory parental involvement laws, thereby limiting the
scope of the right to those mature under state law.96 In so enacting,
the question of a minor's right to an abortion was implicated. 97 In
a series of cases from 1976 to 1992, the Supreme Court attempted
to clarify the right of the juvenile to an abortion, the right of the
state, and the rights of the parent.98
The first case decided by the Supreme Court on this topic was
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.99 The case involved a Missouri
law that required an unmarried minor to seek parental consent to
have an abortion.'00 The Supreme Court struck down the law,
reasoning that the consent statute created a veto over a minor's
constitutional right to have an abortion.01' The Court reasoned that
"[c] onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority."' 2 Thus,
a juvenile does have a right to have an abortion which, like an
adult's abortion right, is protected from state infringement. The
court did not, however, allow access to abortion in the same way
Roe does. Rather than allowing free and unfettered access to
abortion where the state has a lessened interest (first trimester), as
in Roe,' '3 the court only precludes statutes that would create an
absolute veto over the juveniles abortion decision.' 4 As we will see,
the right to an abortion that cannot be vetoed does not preclude the
state from making the process exceptionally difficult.
Three years after Danforth, the Supreme Court in Bellotti v.
Baird... was presented with an opportunity to clarify the ambigu-
ities remaining from Roe and Danforth. The litigation in Bellotti
concerned a Massachusetts parental consent requirement.
Ultimately, the statute was found to be unconstitutional on two
grounds.0 6 First, the statute allowed a court to decline consent for
a juvenile who is found to be mature for the purposes of the decision
96. Weissmann, supra note 8, at 133-34.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
100. Id. at 58.
101. Id. at 74.
102. Id.
103. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
104. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75.
105. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). This decision was the second opportunity the
Supreme Court had to review the litigation between Bellotti and Baird. The first review
resulted in remand with instructions to certify the case to the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court for interpretation of the statute. See Christopher M. Law, A House of Fools:
The Child Custody Protection Act, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 717, 729-731 (2000).
106. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 651.
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to have an abortion.' °7 Although the Massachusetts statute, unlike
the parental involvement statute in Danforth, allowed the juvenile
an opportunity to bypass the parental consent requirement by
petition to the court, this bypass provision failed to alleviate the
threat of veto, as it is within the discretion of the court to deny the
constitutional rights of the juvenile without cause."0 ' This indicates
that the constitutional right possessed by a minor will. fully vest
only if she is, or is adjudged to be, mature.
The second portion of the statute the Supreme Court deemed
unconstitutional required a juvenile seeking an abortion to notify
and discuss with her parents her decision in all cases." 9 As is true
in the context of parental consent, there must be a bypass provision
wherein a juvenile can circumvent the impediment placed on her
right by legislated parental involvement." ° The court states:
.many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct both
an abortion and their access to court. It would be unrealistic,
therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal right to
seek relief in superior court provides an effective avenue of relief
for some of those who need it the most.
We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation such as
that undertaken by Massachusetts, every minor must have the
opportunity - if she so desires - to go directly to a court
without first consulting or notifying her parents. If she satisfies
the court that she is mature and well enough informed to make
intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the court must
authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent.
If she fails to satisfy the court that she is competent to make
this decision independently, she must be permitted to show that
an abortion nevertheless would be in her best interests. If the
court is persuaded that it is, the court must authorize the
abortion. If, however, the court is not persuaded by the minor
that she is mature or that the abortion would be in her best
interests, it may decline to sanction the operation.11'
The court clearly states that any parental involvement statute
must include a judicial bypass provision whereby a juvenile can
prove her maturity, without first notifying or gaining consent of her
107. Id.
108. See id. at 650-51.
109. Id. at 651.
110. Id. at 647.
111. Id. at 647-48.
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parents, and if she proves her maturity then she must be allowed
to exercise her right without parental consent or notification.112
Further, even if she cannot prove maturity the court must still
grant the abortion if it is in her best interests.
113
Two years later H.L. v. Matheson was decided.114 Although this
case is represented by some as an attack upon a minor's right to
choose," 5 the case only reiterates the permissibility of a notification
statute.'16 The critical issue developing from Roe, Danforth, and
Bellotti is the possible role of a parental involvement statute as a
veto on the right of ajuvenile. As Bellotti makes clear, the presence
of a judicial bypass provision is critical for the protection of a
juvenile's constitutionally protected abortion right.117 In language
that seems to limit the juvenile's abortion right, the Court states
that the fact "[t]hat the requirement of notice to parents may
inhibit some minors from seeking abortions is not a valid basis to
void the statute as applied to appellant and the class properly
before us.""' It is important to note, however, that the class in
question is that of an "unemancipated minor who desires an
abortion without parental notification but also desires not to
explain to anyone her reasons either for wanting the abortion or for
not wanting to notify her parents.""' 9 In effect, the class is that
class who declines judicial bypass. Simply put, a veto of rights
cannot exist where the juvenile declines to exercise her rights.
Further, "[w]e cannot assume that the statute, when challenged in
a proper case, will not be construed also to exempt demonstrably
mature minors."
120
In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,121 a new
standard was established that may have led or may lead to a
weakening of the right to an abortion, particularly for minors.'22 In
upholding an Ohio law that upheld a judicial bypass provision,123
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
115. Law, supra note 105, at 732-33.
116. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 398.
117. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647-48.
118. Matheson U.S. at 413.
119. Id. at 417-18 (Powell, J., concerring).
120. Id. at 406.
121. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
122. Weissmann, supra note 8, at 136.
123. Akron, 497 U.S. at 508, 510. The judicial bypass provision required clear and
convincing evidence to show the maturity or the juvenile or that the abortion was in the best
interests of the juvenile. Id.
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Akron introduces the undue burden standard124 that currently
defines the state of abortion law. 125
Finally, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the undue burden
standard was explicitly identified as the standard governing
abortion law.126 The danger of the undue burden standard is said
to be that it relaxes the tight fit between the law's purpose and the
means employed. 27 In effect, the state must now merely show that
the means employed are not an excessive impediment to the right
of the juvenile to get an abortion. 2 ' This relieves the state of part
of its burden to show its interest in the legislation. 29 It is not
immediately apparent what effect this change may have on
parental involvement law, except that it removes the likelihood that
parental involvement laws are per se unconstitutional. The reason
for this is that the state requires less justification for its interest in
parental involvement laws, and no longer needs to show a tight fit
between the law and the means.
IV. VIRGINIA AND THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
In the 1990's changes were made to the statutory system
effecting the way in which juvenile court transfers, '
124. Id. at 519-20.
125. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
126. Id.
127. Weissmann, supra note 8, at 140.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (2001). The statute provides in part:
A. Except as provided in subsections B and C, if a juvenile fourteen years of age
or older at the time of an alleged offense is charged with an offense which would
be a felony if committed by an adult, the court shall, on motion of the attorney
for the Commonwealth and prior to a hearing on the merits, hold a transfer
hearing and may retain jurisdiction or transfer such juvenile for proper
criminal proceedings to the appropriate circuit court having criminal
jurisdiction of such offenses if committed by an adult. Any transfer to the
appropriate circuit court shall be subject to the following conditions:
1. Notice as prescribed in §§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264 shall be given to the
juvenile and his parent, guardian, legal custodian or other person standing in
loco parentis; or attorney;
2. The juvenile court finds that probable cause exists to believe that the
juvenile committed the delinquent act as alleged or a lesser included delinquent
act which would be a felony if committed by an adult;
3. The juvenile is competent to stand trial. The juvenile is presumed to be
competent and the burden is on the party alleging the juvenile is not competent
to rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence; and
4. The court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the juvenile is not
a proper person to remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In
determining whether a juvenile is a proper person to remain within the
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jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the court shall consider, but not be limited to,
the following factors:
a. The juvenile's age;
b. The seriousness and number of alleged offenses, including (i) whether the
alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful
manner; (ii) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, with
greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if death or
bodily injury resulted; (iii) whether the maximum punishment for such an
offense is greater than twenty years confinement if committed by an adult; (iv)
whether the alleged offense involved the use of a firearm or other dangerous
weapon by brandishing, threatening, displaying or otherwise employing such
weapon; and (v) the nature of the juvenile's participation in the alleged offense;
c. Whether the juvenile can be retained in the juvenile justice system long
enough for effective treatment and rehabilitation;
d. The appropriateness and availability of the services and dispositional
alternatives in both the criminal justice and juvenile justice systems for dealing
with the juvenile's problems;
e. The record and previous history of the juvenile in this or other
jurisdictions, including (i) the number and nature of previous contacts with
juvenile or circuit courts, (ii) the number and nature of prior periods of
probation, (iii) the number and nature of prior commitments to juvenile
correctional centers, (iv) the number and nature of previous residential and
community-based treatments, (v) whether previous adjudications and
commitments were for delinquent acts that involved the. infliction of serious
bodily injury, and (vi) whether the alleged offense is part of a repetitive pattern
of similar adjudicated offenses;
f. Whether the juvenile has previously absconded from the legal custody of
a juvenile correctional entity in this or any other jurisdiction;
g. The extent, if any, of the juvenile's degree of mental retardation or mental
illness;
h. The juvenile's school record and education;
i. The juvenile's mental and emotional maturity; and
j. The juvenile's physical condition and physical maturity.
No transfer decision shall be precluded or reversed on the grounds that the
court failed to consider any of the factors specified in subdivision A 4 of this
section.
B. The juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing whenever a
juvenile fourteen years of age or older is charged with murder in violation of §§
18.2-31, 18.2-32 or § 18.240, or aggravated malicious wounding in violation of§
18.2-51.2.
C. The juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing whenever a
juvenile fourteen years of age or older is charged with murder in violation of §
18.2-33, felonious injury by mob in violation of§ 18.2-4 1, abduction in violation
of § 18.2-48, malicious wounding in violation of § 18.2-51, malicious wounding
of a law-enforcement officer in violation of § 18.2-51.1, felonious poisoning in
violation of § 18.2-54.1, adulteration of products in violation of § 18.2-54.1,
robbery in violation of § 18.2-58 or carjacking in violation of § 18.2-58.1, rape
in violation of § 18.2-61, forcible sodomy in violation of § 18.2-67.1 or object
sexual penetration in violation of § 18.2-67.2, provided the attorney for the
Commonwealth gives written notice of his intent to proceed pursuant to this
subsection. The notice shall be filed with the court and mailed or delivered to
counsel for the juvenile or, if the juvenile is not then represented by counsel, to
the juvenile and a parent, guardian or other person standing in loco parentis
with respect to the juvenile at least seven days prior to the preliminary hearing.
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dispositional discretion of juvenile court judges, 31 and judicial
bypass for mature minors seeking an abortion, 132 are handled in
Virginia. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit, in Blue Ridge v.
Camblos, interpreted the Virginia judicial bypass statute to require
a mature juvenile to notify a parent of her decision to have an
abortion. '33 The interpretation provided by the Fourth Circuit in
Camblos, causes Virginia to have one of the most restrictive
statutes regarding parental involvement in the nation. These
changes marks Virginia's deep involvement in the national trend of
declaring juveniles responsible for their criminal acts and yet
insufficiently responsible to exercise their constitutional abortion
rights without impediment and interference.
A. Juvenile Justice and Criminal Responsibility in Virginia
In 1994, Virginia passed several reform proposals propagated
by the Virginia Commission of Youth's study of serious juvenile
offenders.1 4  The first reform implemented a revised transfer
statute.35 The revision, while simplifying the structure of the
statute, also lowered the minimum age of transfer from fifteen to
fourteen. '36 Professor Shepherd summarizes the procedures
established by the revised transfer statute as follows:
Upon the filing of the Commonwealth's motion, the court must
hold a transfer hearing. Furthermore, the court must hold the
If the attorney for the Commonwealth elects not to give such notice, or if he
elects to withdraw the notice prior to certification of the charge to the grand
jury, he may proceed as provided in subsection A.
Id.
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285. 1(C) (2001).
132. VA. CODE ANN. § 16. 1-241(V) (2001). The Statute provides in pertinent part as
follows:
Petitions filed by a juvenile seeking judicial authorization for a physician to
perform an abortion if a minor elects not to allow notice to an authorized
person. After a hearing, a judge may authorize a physician to perform an
abortion upon finding that the minor is mature and capable of giving informed
consent to the proposed abortion. If the judge determines that the minor is not
mature, the judge shall, after a hearing, determine whether the performance
of an abortion upon the minor without notice to an authorized person would be
in the minor's best interest, and if the court finds that the abortion would be in
the minor's best interest, it shall so authorize a physician.
Id.
133. Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 116 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 1997).
134. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues Involving
Children, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1075, 1076-77 (1994).
135. Id. at 1077.
136. Id.
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hearing in a bifurcated fashion, with the determination of
probable cause that the juvenile committed an act that would be
a felony if committed by an adult as the initial decision. In
addition, the court must also decide if the youth is competent to
stand trial, with a presumption of competency which must be
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence by the party
alleging incompetency. If the juvenile is fourteen years of age
or older and is charged with a Class One or Two felony under
Chapter 4 of Title 18.2 or with an unclassified felony pursuant
to the same chapter with a maximum penalty of life imprison-
ment or imprisonment for a term of forty years if committed by
an adult, the court may transfer the case to circuit court if it
finds the child was (1) at least fourteen at the time of the
commission of the offense, (2) that the child is competent to
stand trial, and (3) that there is probable cause that the juvenile
committed the offense. If the juvenile is sixteen years old or
older, a finding of probable cause for commission of a Class
Three felony violation of Chapter 4 of Title 18.2 for murder
under Article 1, a mob-related felony under Article 2, kidnap-
ping or abduction under Article 3, or assault or bodily wounding
under Article 4, coupled with the jurisdictional and competency
findings will warrant transfer.
If a juvenile who is fourteen years of age or older is charged
with any other felony, then the court must enter into the second
stage of the bifurcated hearing, which is a determination by a
preponderance of the evidence of whether the "juvenile is not a
proper person to remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court." The factors enumerated include: (a) age; (b) the serious-
ness and number of offenses, with a particular focus on the
violence of the offense and the degree of the juvenile's culpabil-
ity; (c) the length of time the juvenile could be kept in the
juvenile justice system for treatment and rehabilitation; (d) the
services and dispositional alternatives available in both the
juvenile and adult systems; (e) the court record and previous
offense history of the juvenile; (f)'the history of escapes from
juvenile correctional facilities; (g) the extent of any mental
retardation or mental illness; (h) the youth's school record and
education; (i) the juvenile's mental and emotional maturity; and
Cj) the physical maturity of the child. There is a curious
anomaly in the section in that it directs the court to consider the
factors, while stating "[n]o transfer decision shall be precluded
or reversed on the grounds that the court failed to consider any
of. . [them] ... 137
137. Id. at 1077-79 (citations omitted).
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The second reform proposal resulted in a change to the length
of time a juvenile serious offender could be committed. 3 ' The
revised statute lengthens the maximum term of determinate
commitment from twelve months to seven years or until the
offender reaches his twenty-first birthday.'39 To be considered a
serious offender under the statute, and thus eligible for greatly
lengthened commitment to a juvenile facility, the offender must be:
fourteen years of age or older who has been found guilty of an
offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and
either (i) the juvenile is on parole for an offense which would be
a felony if committed by an adult, (ii) the juvenile was commit-
ted to the state for an offense which would be a felony if
committed by an adult within the immediately preceding twelve
months, (iii) the felony offense is punishable by a term of
confinement of greater than twenty years if the felony was
committed by an adult, or (iv) the juvenile has been previously
adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by an
adult would be a felony punishable by a term of confinement of
twenty years or more, and the circuit court, or the juvenile or
family court, as the case may be, finds that commitment under
this section is necessary to meet the rehabilitative needs of the
juvenile and would serve the best interests of the community. 140
The extension of the punishment of the serious offender may
nevertheless be meliorated by the discretion of the judge.'4 ' Factors
similar to those considered in the transfer of the juvenile are used
by the juvenile court judge to determine if the juvenile should be
exposed to a longer term of commitment. These factors include: 1)
the juvenile's age; 2) the seriousness, nature, and number of
present offenses; 3) record and previous offense of the juvenile; and
4) Department of Youth and Family Service's recommended length
of stay. 1
42
138. Id. at 1082. See, VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1(C) (2001). The statute reads, in
pertinent part:
In ordering commitment pursuant to this section, the court shall specify a
period of commitment not to exceed seven years or the juvenile's twenty-first
birthday, whichever shall occur first. The court may also order a period of
determinate or indeterminate parole supervision to follow the commitment but
the total period of commitment and parole supervision shall not exceed seven
years or the juvenile's twenty-first birthday, whichever occurs first.
Id.
139. Shepherd, supra note 134, at 1082.
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1(A) (2001).
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1(B) (2001).
142. Id.
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Both reforms promulgated by the Virginia Commission of
Youth's study of serious juvenile offenders, lead to a reduction in
the age at which a juvenile can be found criminally responsible.
This is most clearly the case in the juvenile transfer provision,
which expands the class of juveniles treated as adults. 3  The
extension ofjuvenile commitment,144 while not shifting the juvenile
to the criminal system, expands punishment well beyond what was
previously supposed to be appropriate for a juvenile.145 Trouble-
somely, it is not altogether clear that the transfer provision is
substantively different from the expanded commitment of serious
juvenile offenders. The basic requirements exposing a juvenile to
transfer or extended commitment are virtually identical.'4 Both
statutes contain similar discretionary considerations for the
determination of transfer.or punishment.'47 Furthermore, in light
of the equivocation of juvenile justice and criminal responsibility
propounded by the Supreme Court,148 it is somewhat disingenuous
to describe a seven-year commitment as non-punitive and rehabili-
tative in nature.
The Commonwealth of Virginia has also instituted a "once an
adult/always an adult" statute.149 According to this statute, once a
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (2001).
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1(C) (2001).
145. As embodied in the previous limit of twelve months.
146. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(A) with VA. CODE ANN § 16.1-285.1(C)
(including requirements that offender is fourteen or older and commits an act that would be
a felony if committed by an adult).
147. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(A) with VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1(C)
(including discretionary considerations like: age, seriousness of offense, suggested juvenile
court punishment and previous record of the juvenile offender).
148. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-271 (2001). The statute reads:
The trial or treatment of a juvenile as an adult pursuant to the provisions of
this chapter shall preclude the juvenile court from taking jurisdiction of such
juvenile for subsequent offenses committed by that juvenile.
Any juvenile who is tried and convicted in a circuit court as an adult under
the provisions of this article shall be considered and treated as an adult in any
criminal proceeding resulting from any alleged future criminal acts and any
pending allegations of delinquency which have not been disposed of by the
juvenile court at the time of the criminal conviction.
All procedures and dispositions applicable to adults charged with such a
criminal offense shall apply in such cases, including, but not limited to, arrest;
probable cause determination by a magistrate or grand jury; the use of a
warrant, summons, or capias instead of a petition to initiate the case; adult bail;
preliminary hearing and right to counsel provisions; trial in a court having
jurisdiction over adults; and trial and sentencing as an adult. The provisions of
this article regarding a transfer hearing shall not be applicable to such
juveniles.
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juvenile is transferred to criminal court and convicted of the charge,
the criminal court will have original jurisdiction over any subse-
quent charge. 5 ° The effect of such a statute is to concretize the
suppositions of criminal responsibility produced by the juvenile
transfer provision.
As a final example of the declining age of responsibility in
Virginia, in Jackson v. Virginia, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld
the death penalty for 16-year-old Chauncey Jacob Jackson.'.
Jackson was charged and convicted of capital murder, attempted
robbery, two firearms charges, conspiracy to commit robbery, and
receipt of stolen property. 152  For this he received a death
sentence.'53 While it is suggestive of Virginia's attitude to youth
and responsibility that it is trying to execute a sixteen year-old, the
penalty phase of the trial is even more suggestive. In an effort to
make it's case for the death penalty, the Commonwealth introduced
evidence of prior misdeeds.' These misdeeds were adjudications
arising from the juvenile court system.'55 The Commonwealth, by
allowing acts committed when the Defendant was thirteen'56 for
purposes of the death penalty sentencing of a sixteen year-old, is
taking the position, intentional or not, that a sixteen year old is so
completely developed in terms of maturity and responsibility that
he can be put to death and that acts committed when thirteen
demonstrate criminal responsibility at that early age.
B. The Parental Notice Act and Planned Parenthood v.
Camblos: The Fourth Circuit, Abortion, and Parental Notice.
In 1999, the Parental Notice Act 57 was signed into law.' This
act "requires that a minor who decides to have an abortion inform
one of her parents twenty-four hours prior to performance of the
procedure." 9 Hours before the law became effective the federal
district court for the Western District of Virginia enjoined the
enforcement of the Act.
60
150. Id.
151. Jackson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1988).
152. Id. at 542.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 543.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Parental Notice Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (2001).
158. Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 1998).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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The district court reasoned that under the standard set forth
under Bellotti v. Baird,16' the Parental Notice Act lacked a
sufficient judicial bypass provision. 16 2  The district court read
Bellotti to require the mandatory waiver of any notification
provision provided that the juvenile can demonstrate her maturity
during a judicial bypass hearing.163
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stayed the district
court's order 6 . and eventually ruled that the Parental Notice Act
was not unconstitutional. 65 The Fourth Circuit argued that the
district court misread Bellotti as creating a requirement and
standard for judicial bypass for parental notice statutes. 66 The
Fourth Circuit reads the Supreme Court precedent as devoid of any
explication of a standard for a judicial bypass provision in the case
of parental notice requirements. 67 Although the Supreme Court
has upheld parental notice statutes with Bellotti-type"6 ' bypass
procedures, the Supreme Court has never explicitly required bypass
procedures for a notice statute. 69
The district court, in support of enjoining the statute, cites the
opinion of Justice Powell from Bellotti addressing this very issue.170
The Fourth Circuit cites the citation of the district court. 71 The
citation reads as follows: "[ilf [a pregnant minor] satisfies the court
that she is mature and well enough informed to make intelligently
the abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her to
act without parental consultation or consent."1 7 2 It is hard to
understand the foregoing passage from Bellotti as establishing at
least the necessity that a judicial bypass provision be included in a
parental notice statute. The Court's opinion in Bellotti clearly
states that a mature juvenile capable of making an informed
judgment cannot be required to act so as to give notice to her
161. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 622.
162. Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d at 356.
163. Id.
164. Camblos, 116 F.3d 707.
165. Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d at 355.
166. Id. at 356-57.
167. Id.
168. Parental consent.
169. Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d at 356-57.
170. Id. at 356.
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting Memorandum Op. at 10, quoting Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647 (op. of Powell,
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parent.' According to Bellotti, the court must authorize her
independent actions.
17 4
The Fourth Circuit states that the Supreme Court "has always
carefully distinguished [parental notice] statutes from parental
consent statutes, explicitly reserving the question of what, if any,
bypass procedures are required for parental notice statutes."'v The
Fourth Circuit is correct in observing that decisions subsequent to
Bellotti state that the Supreme Court has never explicitly required
a judicial bypass provision. 7 ' This, however, would seem to
surprise the dissent in Bellotti. 7  Justice White, like the district
court for the Western District of Virginia, reads the Bellotti opinion
as clearly stating that a minor found mature by a court must be
excused from any parental consent or notice statute.' v Justice
White, in his dissent, summarizes the opinion of the court as
follows:
Going beyond Danforth, the Court now holds it unconstitutional
for a State to require that in all cases parents receive notice that
their daughter seeks an abortion and, if they object to the
abortion, an opportunity to participate in a hearing that will
determine whether it is in the "best interests" of the child to
undergo the surgery. Until now, I would have thought
inconceivable a holding that the United States Constitution
forbids even notice to parents when their minor child who seeks
surgery objects to such notice and is able to convince a judge
that the parents should be denied participation in the
decision.'79
It seems quite clear, to even the dissent, that Bellotti speaks to
parental notice as well as parental consent laws.
173. Bellotti, 443 at 647. The Court states:
We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation such as that undertaken by
Massachusetts, every minor must have the opportunity - if she so desires - to
go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents. If she
satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough informed to make
intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her to
act without parental consultation or consent.
Id. (emphasis added).
174. Id.
175. Id. Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d at 357 (citing Lambert v. Wicklund, 520
U.S. 292, 295-88 (1997) and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502,
510-11 (1990)).
176. Akron, 497 U.S. at 510-11; Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997).
177. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 657 (White, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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To be fair, Bellotti is a 4/4/1 split decision. ' The lead opinion,
while providing the acknowledged constitutional framework of
much of the debate regarding parental involvement laws, is not an
opinion that expresses the opinion of a true majority of the court.
This fact, however, fails to diminish the effect of the opinion in the
parental consent cases.
Furthermore, Bellotti is a parental consent case."8' Seemingly
any opinion it has to give on the issue of parental notice acts is
dicta. Perhaps this is so despite the reading given the case by
Justice White in his dissent.
Supposing then, that those portions of Bellotti relevant to the
issue in Camblos are not binding on the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth
Circuit's assertion that no judicial bypass provision is
constitutionally required for a parental notification statute seems
to be based on two grounds.' 2 First, the Supreme Court has, of
late, declared that they have never spoken to the issue of judicial
bypass requirements in parental notification laws. Assuming that
statements concerning parental notification, like those in Belotti,
are dicta produced in the context of parental consent cases, the
Fourth Circuit is certainly not bound to case law that does not exist.
The problem is that the Fourth Circuit takes the initiative and
denies that the right to judicial bypass of parental notification
provisions for juveniles exists.' 3 The Fourth Circuit further claims,
contrary to their earlier supposition of Supreme Court silence, that
precedent exists undermining the right to judicial bypass of
parental notice laws.'84
The Fourth Circuit relies, in part, on H.L. v. Matheson."8 5 As
mentioned earlier, Matheson is often misread.186 The Fourth
Circuit reads the case for the following proposition: "a state can,
without providing any bypass procedure at all, constitutionally
require notice to the parents of an unemancipated minor who has
'made no claim or showing as to her maturity or as to her relations
with her parents"'.187 This reading is not uncommon.'88 Matheson,
however, only stands for the proposition that a parental notification
180. Id. at 647.
181. Id.
182. Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d at 363.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 363.
185. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 398.
186. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
187. Camblos, 155 F.3d at 363.
188. Law, supra note 105, at 732-33.
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statute is permissible under the Constitution. 9 This holding is not
surprising in that the run of cases from Roe to Casey all uphold the
state's right to impose an even stricter constriction of the juvenile's
right in the form of parental consent statutes. As Bellotti makes
clear, the presence of a judicial bypass provision is critical for the
protection of a juvenile's constitutionally protected abortion
rights.19 ° The Matheson court does state that "the requirement of
notice to parents may inhibit some minors from seeking abortions
is not a valid basis to void the statute as applied to appellant and
the class properly before us."191  The critical portion of this
statement is the reference to the appellant and her class. The
appellant challenged the statute on the ground that it inhibited a
mature minor's exercise of her right to an abortion.' 92 The
appellant, however, refused to express the basis of her maturity in
a bypass hearing, and thus declined the bypass provision.193
The appellant's challenge in Matheson is that it is
unconstitutional to require a pregnant juvenile to serve notice to
her parents of her desire to have an abortion.194 The class that the
appellant represents is that of an "unemancipated minor who
desires an abortion without parental notification but also desires
not to explain to anyone her reasons either for wanting the abortion
or for not wanting to notify her parents."195 The class is that class
who declines judicial bypass. In Camblos, on the other hand, the
class is those juveniles who seek to be or are adjudged mature in a
bypass hearing.196
The Fourth Circuit's confusion over Matheson is further
compounded by the representation in Matheson that the holding
should not be extended to cases like Camblos, involving juvenile's
who have submitted themselves to a bypass hearing. The Matheson
court states, "[w] e cannot assume that the statute, when challenged
in a proper case, will not be construed also to exempt demonstrably
mature minors."1 97 Thus, in upholding the statute, the court is not
addressing the issue in Cambrol, nor are they departing from their
position in Bellotti.
189. Matheson, 450 U.S. 409.
190. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647-48.
191. Matheson, 450 U.S at 413.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 417-18
194. Id. at 405.
195. Id.
196. Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d at 352.
197. Id. at 406.
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This position is reflected in the Camblos concurrences.19 The
opinion of Judge Widener describes the interpretation of the word
"may" in the statute199 as allowing a judge to decline to obviate the
notice requirement of a juvenile judged to be mature is an abuse of
discretion.2 0 Under the precedent, a juvenile who is found to be
mature must be authorized to have an abortion.2 1
The concurrence in the judgment of Judge Michael is much less
charitable to the majority. This opinion argues, with Judge
Widener, that precedent requires the reading of "may" in a
compulsory sense.20 2 Judge Michael moves on to argue that,
Virginia precedent aside, the court must read "may" as "must" to
meet the requirements of constitutionality.2 3
Judge Michael makes the "maturity argument" that is at the
heart of this Note.20 4 Judge Michael argues that the predicate of a
198, Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 115 F.3d at 385-92 (Widener, J., concurring;
Michael, J., joined by Murnaghan, J., Ervin, J., and Motz, J., concurring in judgment).
199. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (2001).
200. Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 115 F.3dat 385.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 386.
203. Id.
204. The conclusion of Judge Michael's maturity argument is as follows:
The Court's statements in these cases make clear that once a minor is found to
be mature and capable of making an informed choice, she must be given the
same consideration as an adult woman when it comes to her constitutional
rights. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 647 (plurality opinion); Akron I, 462 U.S. at
428 n.10; Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 453-54. Thus, the state cannot impose any
restrictions on a mature minor's right to choose an abortion that cannot be
imposed on an adult woman. See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452,
1460 (8th Cir. 1995) (Arnold, C.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Janklow v. Planned
Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 134 L. Ed. 2d679, 116 5. Ct. 1582 (1996); see also
Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 123 F.3d 849, 851 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jones,
J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc) (Under Bellotti II "[i]f the court finds
[a young woman] sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision, that is the
end of the matter. Neither the court nor the parents can tell her what to do").
Until today, this principle has led every circuit considering the issue to conclude
that any statute which forbids mature minors from obtaining abortions without
parental notice is unconstitutional unless it provides a mandatory judicial
bypass. See, e.g., Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1104-06
(5th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc denied 123 F.3d 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 357 (1997); Miller, 63 F.3d at 1459-61; Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532,
1536 (7th Cir. 1985), affd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 171 (1987);
Indiana Planned Parenthood Affiliate Assoc. v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1134
(7th Cir. 1983) (A parental notice statute "constitutionally cannot... give the
juvenile court the authority to refuse to waive notification despite a finding that
the minor is mature"). Against this background, I cannot agree with the
majority's conclusion that the Constitution allows a state to forbid mature
minors from exercising their right to an abortion unless they first notify their
parents.
Id. at 388.
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State or parent infringing on the constitutional right to an abortion
is maturity.0 5 Without sufficient maturity the juvenile's rights can
be constrained for the better judgment of the state, court, or
parent.0 6 Once the juvenile is found to be mature there is no
justification for the state to infringe on the constitutional right to
an abortion.0 7 To rephrase, once a juvenile is found to be mature
she is fully vested with her right to have an abortion. "Parents have
a traditional and substantial interest in, as well as a responsibility
for, the rearing and welfare of their children, especially during
immature years. ''2°8
V. THE SCHIZOPHRENIA OF MATURITY AND THE LAW
For the most part, [presuming that an adolescent is an adult for
some purposes and a child for other] works well. A bright line
rule that designates a particular age as the boundary between
childhood and adulthood for multiple purposes (the "age of
majority"), regardless of actual maturity, has the advantage of
providing a clear signal of the attainment of adult legal status.
It is also administratively efficient and promotes parental
responsibility. Moreover, by shifting the boundary and
extending adult rights and duties at different ages for different
purposes, lawmakers accomplish the transition from childhood
to adulthood gradually . . . . In some contexts, however,
categorical assumptions that ignore the transitional stage of
adolescence can lead to harmful outcomes.0 9
Some level of schizophrenia, as it relates to maturity, must
inhere in the law for a variety of reasons. First, different rights and
responsibilities within a society may .have legitimately different
consequences and requirements. For example, one who is mature
enough to drive a car may not possess the requisite capacity to
serve in the armed forces. Due to developmental differences,
pornographic or graphically violent literary material may have an
effect on a minor that would not be experienced by an adult.
Second, some rights and responsibilities may implicate the
Constitution in ways other rights do not. An example of this is a
woman's right to an abortion, and a woman's right to drive. 210
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 419.
209. Scott, supra note 6, at 548-49.
210. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 824-47 (discussing and comparing ages
of maturity for activities like: right to gamble, drive, purchase pornography, right to vote,
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Whatever interest a state may have in limiting some right, must be
balanced against the individual's Constitutional entitlement to such
a right.2" It is the contention of this Note, as far as juvenile justice
and juvenile abortion rights are concerned, no such balance is
struck. The will of the majority, as embodied in the state's interest
in crime prevention and unborn children, has acted to the detriment
of minors by establishing conflicting capacity standards.
A. The Occasional Concern for the Dangerous Immaturity of
Pregnant Minors in Virginia
It is evident that under the Supreme Court's abortion
jurisprudence a State does have an interest in an unborn fetus.212
This interest must be weighed against the interest of the pregnant
21woman. 18 Under the reasoning of Danforth and its successors, this
interest is also weighed against the rights of the pregnant juvenile.
Due to the age of the juvenile, and her lack of maturity, the rights
of the juvenile are not fully vested as a matter of statutory
presumption." 4 The rights of the juvenile must be weighed against
those of the state, and those possessed by her parent.215 Generally
considered, parents possess rights as trustees of the portion of the
juvenile's rights that have yet to vest in the juvenile216 , as well as
those rights attributable to the parents qua parents.21 7 The state
may thus exercise its interest in the welfare of the fetus by
requiring the consent or notice of the juvenile's parents, provided
that there is a judicial bypass provision.21 8
The peculiar position ofjudicial bypass in the state of Virginia,
as demonstrated by the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the
Parental Notice Act 21 9 in Camblos,221 is further exacerbated by
Virginia law concerning medical care for minors.221 Section E of
this act establishes the presumed maturity of a juvenile to consent
right to drive, and right to serve on a jury).
211. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-34.
212. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149-50.
213. Id. at 154-56.
214. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
215. Id.
216. Scott, supra note 6, at 551.
217. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
639 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925);.
218. See supra note 217.
219. Parental Notice Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (2001).
220. Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d at 352.
221. VA. CODE ANN. §54.1-2969 (2001).
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to certain medical procedures. 222 Among these procedures is "birth
control, pregnancy [and] family planning.... 223 On some level, the
contraposition of presumed immaturity for abortion procedures and
presumed maturity for pregnancy related medical treatment is
absurd. If the justification for abortion restrictions are the state's
interest in the health of the unborn fetus, and a minor is presumed
incompetent in this regard, it seems contradictory that Virginia
should trust juveniles with pre-natal care of their unborn children
without any requirement of state or parental assistance.
Admittedly there is a difference between terminating and
maintaining a pregnancy. A state will have greater interests in the
former. Nevertheless, if the Virginia House of Delegates is sincere
in its concern for the rights of the fetus and those of the parent, and
is sincere in its belief that minor females are per se immature when
it comes to child-bearing rights, it is difficult to understand why the
Virginia House of Delegates abandons unborn children to the
feckless hands of immature and incompetent women.
Is it really female immaturity with which Virginia and the
Fourth Circuit is concerned?
B. Finishing Second to Last in the Race to Justify Transfer to
Criminal Court? Maturity.
In the list of enumerated factors for transfer of a juvenile to
criminal court, maturity is listed eighth out of nine factors.224
Certainly, severity of the crime, mental retardation, recidivism,
amenability to rehabilitation, physical maturity, school record, and
previous escape from custody are important factors. 225  It is
nevertheless peculiar to suppose that the Virginia House of
Delegates is not averse to the transfer of ajuvenile to criminal court
based on factors other than sufficient maturity for criminal
culpability. Maturity, after all is only one of nine factors to be
weighed together. Not surprisingly, the statute provides
assurances that when an immature minor slips through the cracks
in the transfer statute, and finds her way into the criminal court
system, that "[n]o transfer decision shall be precluded or reversed
on the grounds that the court failed to consider any of the factors
specified.... 226
222. Id. §2969(E).
223. Id. §2969(E)(2).
224. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (2001).
225. Id.
226. Id.
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"It is generally agreed 'that punishment should be directly
related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.' 227
"There is also broad agreement on the proposition that adolescents
as a class are less mature and responsible than adults. 228 While
maturity is a mitigating factor in criminal court dispositions, it is
not a factor in criminal court adjudication. Thus, the Virginia
General Assembly may ultimately be begging off the issue of
criminal responsibility entirely. If maturity is only one of many
factors, without any statutory language requiring sufficient
maturity to establish even a minimal notion of criminal culpability,
and if the failure to consider criminal culpability qua maturity is
not grounds for reversal of the transfer decision, then culpability is
irrelevant but for judicial discretion.
C. The Body Politic Cuts Off its Head to Spite its Progeny
In both, the juvenile transfer statute229 and the Parental Notice
Act 230 concerns for maturity are legislated.231 In practice, however,
maturity is downplayed and is subverted to state's interest in
fetuses and crime prevention. The effort of the Virginia House of
Delegates, and legislatures nationally, to abrogate a minor's right
to an abortion through parental involvement statutes, and to
minimize the relationship between culpability and punishment
through juvenile transfer statutes, is indicative of a will to sacrifice
constitutional rights' and traditional notions of justice to the
appetites of the body politic. What is most telling is that the
consistent subversion of rights expresses itself in the appearance of
inconsistency. Juvenile transfer statutes generally lower the age of
responsibility while parental involvement statutes tend to raise the
age of responsibility. In either case, it is the image of the acts of
criminality and abortion that is driving this schizophrenic approach
to responsibility.
In a multitude of states, the simple act of committing a serious
crime will result in transfer to criminal court. Such transfers are
made without regard to maturity, sometimes without a hearing,
227. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
228. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834.
229. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1.
230. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241.
231. In both statutes maturity is listed as a factor for consideration. Unfortunately, in the
transfer provision maturity is only one of nine facts and in the Parental Notice Act an
adjudication of maturity does not necessitate the vesting of the minor's abortion rights. See
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269. 1; Parental Notice Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241.
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and occasionally without regard to age.232 The movement of the
law, away from treatment of the juvenile offender to punishment of
the offensive act, is seemingly complete as to certain offenses. 233 It
is the act which provides the face and focus for the court system,
allowing the appearance of severe malfeasance to replace notions of
culpability.
In Stanford v. Kentucky, Justice Scalia delivers the opinion of
the court, denying a challenge to death penalty convictions by a
sixteen and seventeen-year-old on Eighth Amendment grounds.234
One of the arguments used by the juveniles is that the
differentiation of ages of responsibility as it relates to different
activities implicates the Eighth Amendment in the inconsistent
application of the law.23 While Justice Scalia's dismissal of this
argument as absurd is accurate, his phrasing is telling.
It is, to begin with, absurd to think that one must be mature
enough to drive carefully, to drink responsibly, or vote
intelligently, in order to be old enough to understand that
murdering another human being is profoundly wrong, and to
conform one's conduct to that most minimal of all civilized
standards. 236
232. Nicole A. Saharsky, Note, Consistency as a Constitutional Value:A Comparative Look
at Age in Abortion and Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1119, 1160 n.221
(2001).
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-501 (Supp. 2000) (automatic waiver if age fifteen
or over and commits a violent crime); Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318 (Michie Supp.
1999) (waiver based seriousness of the offense with minimum transfer age of
fourteen); Colo. Rev. Stat. 19-2-518 (1)(a)(I)(A) (2000) (allowing transfer at age
twelve upon commission of certain felonies and violent crimes); Idaho Code 20-
508, 20-509 (Michie Supp. 1997) (no minimum age required for transfer, based
on list of crimes); Miss. Code Ann. 43-21-157 (1) (2000) (allowing transfer at age
thirteen based on seriousness of the offense); Mo. Ann. Stat. 211.071 (1) (West
1996) (allowing transfer at age twelve, based on type of offense); Mont. Code
Ann. 41-5-206 (1)(a) (1999) (allowing transfer at age twelve, based on offense);
N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-2200 (1999) (allowing transfer at age thirteen if criminal act
was a felony); Or. Rev. Stat. 419C.340 (1997), 419C.352 (Supp. 1998) (transfer
allowed, with no minimum age specified, if certain crimes charged); R.I. Gen.
Laws 14-1-7, 14-1-7.2 (1994), 14-1-7.1 (Supp. 1999) (no minimum age
requirement for transfer, based on type of offense); S.D. Codified Laws 26-11-1,
26-11-4 (Michie 1999) (no minimum age requirement for transfer, based on type
of crime); . . . [Okla. Stat. tit. 10 7001.3 (2001)] (Oklahoma statute that
authorizes adult treatment based only on the seriousness of the offense).
Id.
233. Id. at 1160.
234. Stanford, 492 U.S. 361.
235. Id. at 374.
236. Id.
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Justice Scalia's mistake is that he allows the appearance of the act
to cloud his reasoning on responsibility.
It does not follow that simply because one is "old enough to
understand that murdering another human being is profoundly
wrong, ''23 one is necessarily criminally culpable for one's act. "Even
the toddler can discharge a firearm and kill an intended victim...,"
and understand that this act is wrong.23 The nature of such
understanding, however, is questionable.
Justice Scalia's view presumes, as many states presume,239 that
commission of an act associated with malice aforethought implies
the presence of malice aforethought. The simple answer to this
contention is that, even in the case of adults, the law allows for
mitigating circumstances, like an uncontrollable emotional reaction,
to meliorate the agent's culpability. It seems strange then, that
Justice Scalia declines to extend the same consideration to
adolescents, whose behavior is marked by antisocial behavior, poor
decision making, and questionable impulse control.24° Studies
indicate that adolescence is marked by psychosocial factors
affecting the judgment of beings otherwise capable of
understanding right and wrong.241 Despite the presence of
understanding in juvenile decision making, the notion that the
juvenile can simply "conform one's conduct to that most minimal of
all civilized standards,"242 is simply misplaced.
The error of behavior conformance aside, Justice Scalia
commits a non-sequitur in his comparing other modes of
responsibility to criminal responsibility. He equates 'carefulness',
'responsibility', and 'intelligence' with 'understanding'. Surely
Justice Scalia can apprehend that a four-year-old possesses an
understanding that killing is wrong. It is doubtful, however, that
the traits of carefulness, responsibility, and intelligence could be
applied to a four-year-old, even though an understanding of
drinking, driving, and voting could be supposed. This error betrays
a more fundamental equating of responsibility and understanding.
Understanding provides no real criteria for determining
responsibility. If it did trends criminalizing juvenile justice would
not only be justified but would be required. Why shouldn't the
237. Id.
238. Saharsky, supra note 232, at 1161 n.222 (citing VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY
FOR JUVENILES 184 (1987)).
239. See supra note 216-223 and accompanying text.
240. Scott, supra note 6, at 155-60.
241. Id. at 162-72. Professor Scott lists peer influence, distorted attitude towards risk, and
variant temporal perspectives as factors adversely affecting juvenile decision-making. Id.
242. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374.
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teenage vandal be punished similarly to the middle-aged vandal if
they were equally culpable? To do otherwise would raise issues of
disparate treatment under the Eighth Amendment, similar, in fact
to supposing the juvenile offender responsible but the pregnant
minor irresponsible when both possess equal levels of
'understanding'.
Justice Scalia, however, need not be pushed to this extreme.
He can always take refuge in the "evolving standards of decency"
jurisprudence of the Eighth Amendment 43 to argue that it is
contrary to standards of decency to allow violent youthful offenders
to evade criminal charges and to allow a juvenile minor to consent
to an abortion. This, "evolving standards ofdecency"jurisprudence,
however, places into doubt whether culpability in any real sense is
required under Justice Scalia's vision of the Eighth Amendment.244
In Stanford, Justice Scalia rejects the notion that the Court
must determine whether "there is a disproportion 'between the
punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness. ,245 He
argues that the "evolving standards of decency" analysis subsumes
"proportionality" analysis as the "'proportionality' analysis itself can
only be conducted on the basis of standards set by our own society;
the only alternative, once again, would be our personal
preferences. 246 Presumably then, if enough states choose to lower
the age of criminal responsibility to seven and the age of maturity
to twenty-one for purposes of abortion, there could be no challenge
under the Constitution.247
Justice Scalia's understanding of proportionality analysis,
however, is flawed. In the year prior to the Court's deciding
Stanford, the Supreme Court decided Thompson v. Oklahoma.248
In Thompson, the Court used the "proportionality" analysis in
deciding that a sixteen-year-old is presumptively immature for
purposes of criminal culpability and the death penalty.249 The court
in Thompson anticipated and resolved Scalia's dichotomy between
personal opinion and community standards of decency by reference
to extensive psychological research into juvenile responsibility.25 °
The court read the psychological research to establish that
243. Id. at 369 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 379-80.
246. Id.
247. Stanford was a 4/4/1 decision. Only three other justices, Justice Rehnquist, Justice
White, and Justice Kennedy assented to Scalia's denial of the "Proportionality" analysis. Id.
248. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 835.
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"[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the
teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her
conduct while at the same time he or she is more apt to be
motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult."2" 1
This view directly contradicts Justice Scalia's easy notion that "to
understand that murdering another human being is profoundly
wrong [is to be able to] conform one's conduct to that most minimal
of all civilized standards.2 2
In equating criminal culpability with understanding,2 3 Scalia
would leave the states to determine criminal responsibility by
reference to whatever they choose. Judging by the inconsistent
application of the age of responsibility, particularly where
constitutional rights are implicated, i.e., recent trends to lower the
age of criminal responsibility and raise the age at which a woman's
constitutional right to an abortion vests, state legislatures are
already invoking "evolving standards of decency."254  Youth is
'indecent,' because the legislators focus, as did Justice Scalia, on the
act. "[S] ome courts consider unwed pregnancy itself to be a sign of
immaturity,"255 some consider juvenile offenders to be "Super-
Predators "256 , and some even consider abortion as "profoundly
wrong and abhorrent to that most minimal of all civilized
standards." '257 It is the consideration, or imagery, of the act that
creates the slackening of notions of responsibility in juvenile justice
and the more stringent notions under parental involvement
statutes, including those in Virginia.
D. The Supreme Court's Circular Precedent on Juvenile
Abortion and Juvenile Justice
The groundwork of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in
juvenile justice and minor abortion rights is self-referential. The
parental involvement cases are cited by the juvenile justice cases,
which are cited by the juvenile death penalty cases. Given the
251. Id.
252. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374
253. This would seem to imply that M'Naughten-type rules could be adopted for all areas
of criminal responsibility.
254. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361-62.
255. Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to
Choose, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1890 (1996).
256. James Herbie DiFonzo, Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Crime, 80 OR. L. REV. 1
(2001). The Super-Predator is a mythical construction of modern delinquency describing
youthful offenders as irreversibly violent and unsalvageable, and is used to justify the
increasingly punitive nature of juvenile justice. Id. at 15.
257. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374.
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nature of precedent this is an unspectacular proposition. Given,
however, the contradictory direction that the ages of responsibility
are moving in these areas, it is surprising to imagine such common
origins.
In re Gault,25 which started juvenile justice down the road to
criminal court,2 59 provided valuable theoretical underpinnings to
the Court's juvenile abortionjurisprudence.26 ° InBellotti, the Court
indicates that "[a] child, merely on account of his minority, is not
beyond the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), 'whatever may be their precise
impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights
is for adults alone.""'26 Thus, that the abortion rights of the juvenile
were even partially vested was the result of precedent like Gault
that allowed for incomplete constitutional rights for juveniles.
These incomplete rights in Gault, however, lead to the
criminalization of juvenile justice.
Thompson, for its part, relies on Bellotti for the notion that
culpability is affected by the psychosocial factors to which an
adolescent is exposed.262 As a death penalty case, Thompson is not
one of the primary focuses of this note, but it provides an additional
counterweight to the criminalizing effects of Gault. Thompson
stands for the proposition that punishment should be directly
related to the culpability of the convicted.263 In its way, Gault has
undermined this principle, despite its attempt to protect juvenile
rights. The ultimate effect of the procedural protections of Gault is
the movement away from rehabilitation for serious offenders.264
This movement to punitive dispositions for juveniles undermines
the relationship of culpability and punishment. Of course, a second
effect of Gault is the protection of minor abortion rights.
VI. MATURITY: A REFLECTION OF THE FACE OF THE ACT,
CONCEALMENT OF THE ACTOR
The reason that Belotti, with the juvenile abortion decisions,
and Gault, with the juvenile justice decisions, lead to disparate
results in the area of culpability is due to the idea of the state's
258. Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
259. See supra notes 36-44, 83-86 and accompanying text.
260. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633.
261. Id.
262. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834.
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
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interest. Both lines of cases are concerned with the protection of
the minor's rights. In the abortion cases the Supreme Court resists
the state's interest in lowering ages of responsibility. In the
juvenile justice cases, however, the Supreme Court argues for a
lowering of the relevant age. The relevant age for the Supreme
Court in juvenile justice cases concerns the age at which procedural
protections are implicated.265 The Court is essential indifferent to
the issue of the age of responsibility in juvenile justice, provided
procedural rights are protected.266
An initial answer to the disparate treatment question raised by
this Note is based in the treatment of procedural and substantive
rights. In the case of abortion, a substantive right, the Supreme
Court consistently argues that maturity and culpability matter to
the vesting of the right. In the case ofjuvenile justice, however, the
court focuses on proper procedure once the actor is submitted to
adjudication. The question of what age the juvenile ought to be for
such adjudication does not fall within the scope of proper procedure
once within the adjudication process. The difficulty in the area of
juvenile justice arises in that expanding adult criminal-type
procedural protections have justified the treatment of the protected
in criminal terms, even if the protected are juveniles.
On the other hand, the substantive/procedural distinction does
not go far in resolving the deeper dilemma of this Note, i.e., why do
the states treat these rights disparately by alternately assigning
adolescents the maturity or culpability of adults and then of
children. The answer to this dilemma lies in the state's interest in
legislating in the areas of crime prevention and protection of human
life. These expressed interests, however, do not explain the
extremity of the pressure to lower the age of criminal responsibility
in the face of contrary psychological literature and to willful
restriction of the abortion right to its absolute extent regardless of
maturity. The ultimate answer to this dilemma, sadly, is political.
The state, as a democratic institution, expresses its interest as
the political will of the body politic. Perhaps the interest of the
state can be best expressed as an interest in punishing acts of
violence and the act of abortion. These interests exist for the state,
and in the body politic, irrespective of the rights threatened by the
state's protection of its interest. After all, the popular image of the
violent juvenile as a mythical super-predator, lacking any
265. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
266. The death penalty decisions are an exception to the general course of the juvenile
justice cases. Thompson argues that age does matter. The death penalty, however,
implicates notions of culpability more strongly than would other areas of juvenile justice.
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semblance of conscience,267 and the murder of unborn children26 are
powerfully visceral images for portions of the public. These images
exist, despite Constitutional protections, in much the same way
disturbing visceral images of violent or pornographic speech exist
for some, despite obvious First amendment protections. Such
imagery is inevitable in the mind of the public and is a proper focus
of legislative action. In the case of juvenile justice and minor
abortion rights, however, this imagery, as embodied in the
legislative focus on the act, has superceded concern for the actor
whose rights are being curtailed through incarceration or abortion
prohibition. Problematically, the states indifference to the actor
leads to an indifference to issues of maturity and culpability in the
law.
As was discussed above,269 the movement of state legislatures
is clearly to treat juvenile crime in terms of bad acts rather than
misguided juveniles. The understanding ofjuvenilejustice in terms
of acts easily extends to abortion in light of particular political
views. If the state is acting to prevent a bad act it will not hesitate
to expand the class to whom a proscription may be created, by
raising ages of responsibility. In the case of abortion the state tries
to prevent the act, and therefore raises the age at which the act
may be committed, while in the case of juvenile justice the state
seeks to punish the act, and therefore lowers the age at which a
person may be held responsible for the act.
In either case, the state seeks protection from the act; the actor
just gets swept along.
CONCLUSION
Although short-term protection of society and fetuses may
tempt one to abrogate notions of criminal responsibility in the name
of democracy; this is unprincipled and contrary to the Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence in Thompson and Bellotti. The first and
last question is: does the protection of the right allow imposition of
a burden where the predicate for such burden is lacking? In the
case of parental involvement laws, the predicate is an immaturity
267. DiFonzo, supra note 245, at 15.
268. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). Madsen demonstrates
the visceral reaction some have to abortion. In Madsen the Supreme Court upheld
restriction on anti-abortion protesting propagated in response to the frequent and disruptive
protests that abortion clinics endure. Id. Aspects of these protests included derogatory
epithets like, "baby killer." Id. at 759.
269. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying notes.
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limiting the constitutional right. In the case of crime and transfer,
the predicate is capacity to form the requisite intent. Intent is more
than mere knowledge, but is, as Thompson points out, capacity. In
both cases the issue is capacity. For political reasons, Virginia is
abrogating these notions by lowering ages of criminal responsibility
and refusing to respect a vested constitutional right where it is
judicially vested through a hearing on maturity. Differing
treatment of juveniles for purposes of the criminal law and the
constitutional right to an abortion betrays an inconsistent at best,
duplicitous at worst, line of thought regarding responsibility. The
criminalization of youth offenders, coupled with the paternalistic
impediments of a juvenile's abortion rights, begs for coherent
treatment. A healthy legal system ought not to support the
hypothetical that: if being an unwed mother were a crime, a
juvenile would be mature enough to be incarcerated, but not mature
enough to exercise her right to an abortion without the help of her
parents.
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